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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Georgia Patsy almost certainly will appeal this case to the Su-
preme Court. What effect the Fifth Circuit's decision will have, if
allowed to stand, depends largely on the commitment of the dis-
trict judges to scrutinize the adequacy of the administrative reme-
dies available to the civil rights plaintiffs. The majority suggests
that the exhaustion requirement and the minimum standards it
provides will give the states incentive to develop speedy and effec-
tive administrative procedures. If the trial courts share the major-
ity's expressed commitment to the spirit of the civil rights legisla-
tion and strictly scrutinize the effectiveness of the administrative
remedies available to the particular plaintiff, the majority's hopes
may be realized. Otherwise, Judge Hatchett's prediction of chilled
civil rights litigation may well come true.
The majority opinion pragmatically implies that potential re-
lief within the state administrative system may not be colorblind.
In effect, the decision suggests that a white plaintiff claiming re-
verse discrimination may well have a better chance of obtaining
state relief than black claimants have traditionally had. Though
not saying so explicitly, the majority thus recognizes that Congress
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (the "Ku Klux Klan Act") spe-
cifically to protect blacks harassed by the Ku Klux Klan and una-
ble to get protection or redress from the states.19 If the majority is
correct, then their decision may well relieve the federal court of the
burden of reverse discrimination suits for which effective state re-
dress exists, while preserving federal forums for litigants who can-
not in fact get effective state relief.
LORI ANN WEINER
Research Editor
PAYTON V. UNITED STATES, - F.2d - (5th Cir. 1981).
Twenty-seven years ago in Dalehite v. United States' the Su-
preme Court held that the negligent actions of government officials
resulting in a fatal nitrate fertilizer explosion did not subject them
to liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act,' because their ac-
19. See, e.g., Justice Douglas's discussion of the background of the Civil Rights Act in
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172-83 (1960).
1. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) states, in part:
[Vol. 35:178
BRIEFLY NOTED
tions were discretionary. Section 2680(a) of the Act protected the
"discretion of the executive or the administrator to act according
to [his] judgment of the best course."' In February 1981, the Fifth
Circuit held in Payton v. United States4 that the "discretionary
function" exemption would not shield the negligence of the Board
of Parole in parolingto a psychopathic criminal who killed three
women upon his release from prison.
Thomas Whisenhant killed Sheryl Lynn Payton in 1976. She
was the third woman he had brutally murdered that year. Three
years earlier the Board of Parole had granted Whisenhant his re-
lease, seemingly ignoring his violent prison record, his history of
violent crime, and psychiatric reports recommending against re-
lease. At Whisenhant's trial for the murder 5 of Mrs. Payton, a psy-
chiatrist testified that the Board of Parole had made a grievous
error bordering on gross negligence in releasing Whisenhant. The
husband and children of Whisenhant's last victim brought this suit
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that the Board's negli-
gent decision to release Whisenhant had proximately caused Mrs.
Payton's death.6 The government claimed that the Board's deci-
sion was discretionary and thus fell within the "discretionary func-
tion" exemption of the Federal Tort Claims Act. The district court
agreed and dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion. On appeal the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded.
Noting that "the very purpose of the Tort Claims Act was to
(b) Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district
courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the
United States, for money damages, accruing on or after January 1, 1945, for in-
jury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within
the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with
the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976). Section 2680(a) reads as follows:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not
apply to-
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Govern-
ment, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or
not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or perform-
ance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the
part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the
discretion involved be abused.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976).
3. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15,. 34 (1953).
4. No. 79-2052 (5th Cir. Feb. 2, 1981).
5. Whisenhant was convicted for the murder.
6. Payton, slip op. at 3355.
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waive the government's traditional all-encompassing immunity
from tort actions and to establish novel and unprecedented gov-
ernmental liability,"'7 Judge Fay, writing for the court, concluded
that the parole decisionmaking process tended to equalize treat-
ment under generalized rules by structuring discretion. Thus, the
parole-granting process did not on its face fall within the discre-
tionary function exemption.'
Because the discretionary function notion is not merely a stat-
utory invention, that characterization was only the starting point
of Fay's analysis of the validity of this cause of action. The discre-
tionary function notion stems from the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers. Quoting Judge McGowan of the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals, Judge Fay emphasized the importance
of preserving a functional separation of powers among the coordi-
nate branches of government. Within these parameters, Fay set
out an analysis sensitive to the constitutional and prudential limits
of judicial review of discretionary executive decisions.
The opinion distinguishes between the discretionary policy de-
cision to reject the rehabilitative approach of parole evaluations in
favor of the present system, and the highly structured process of
applying the current system. Freedom from judicial scrutiny is
necessary in making policy decisions, to ensure "the ability of ad-
ministrators to govern by aggressive and effective decisionmak-
ing." Scrutiny of the latter would not intrude on executive deci-
sionmaking but does introduce the question of "whether this
individual can be expected to absorb his loss as incident to an ac-
ceptable social or political risk of governmental activities." 10 The
7. Id. at 3359 (quoting Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319 (1957)).
8. Until 1973 the Federal Board of Parole made release decisions on the basis of meet-
ing with the inmate and a caseworker. Board members did not refer to any formal criteria or
guidelines-their decisions were personal psychological judgments. As a result, there was a
great deal of arbitrariness in the system. In 1973, responding to criticism about the old
system, the Board established a new, formal set of guidelines for parole decisionmaking. The
guidelines included a matrix of an "offense severity" index and a "salient factor score" in-
dex. The "offense severity" index represents the assignment of weights, from one to six, to
the crimes that most commonly come before the Board. The "salient factor score," an actua-
rial device, incorporates various bits of information about the particular inmate to predict
the risk of repeated behavior. Plotting the inmate's "salient factor score" and "offense se-
verity" rating on the matrix will give the parole examiner a range of months for the length
of time the inmate should be incarcerated before receiving parole. Although the Board is not
bound to apply the guidelines strictly, any deviation from them must be supported in writ-
ing. These factors provided the basis for Judge Fay's conclusion that the process was some-
what mechanical and ministerial. Id. at 3359-63.
9. Id. at 3364; see United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 163 (1963).
10. Id. at 3365; see Note, Separation of Powers and the Discretionary Function Excep-
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answer in this case, said Fay, was no.
To support his conclusions, Judge Fay catalogued the ex-
panding judicial doctrine creating a public duty to supervise those
within the government's charge. In the past five years courts in
various jurisdictions have recognized a duty to supervise dangerous
mental patients, a duty to notify appropriate officials of the release
of dangerous mental patients and parolees, and a duty to warn po-
tential victims. Judicial review of the decision of the Board of Pa-
role to release Whisenhant would be consistent with this develop-
ing doctrine, Fay declared, and would not threaten governmental
processes.
Judge Fay concluded his analysis by considering the possible
benefits of stricter judicial scrutiny of such governmental activity
and the amenability of such suits to judicial standards of review.
Requiring increased governmental accountability, Fay reasoned,
would serve as an incentive for more responsible administration.
The actions of government personnel in these cases need not evade
review for lack of standards, because either the 'reasonable man'
tort standard or a professional standard could easily provide the
appropriate framework for analysis.
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Payton v. United States, while
both finely reasoned and constructed, is also a forthright statement
of judicial and governmental responsibility. The court has recog-
nized that the expansion of government is often accompanied by
an increased risk of harm to individual citizens. The government
can not escape responsibility for compensating for that increased
risk when it materializes into actual harm. By waiving the govern-
mental cloak of sovereign immunity to some extent, Congress had
provided the means for fairly ensuring that the costs of dangerous
governmental activity do not fall entirely on a few. The Fifth Cir-
cuit's decision is an affirmative declaration that at least this court
will not allow that governmental cloak of sovereign immunity to
hide and protect negligent parole board decisions.
LORI ANN WEINER
Research Editor
tion: Political Question in Tort Litigation Against the Government, 56 IowA L. REV. 930
(1971).
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